Planned relocation has gained recent prominence as a tool for reducing vulnerable communities' exposure to the impacts of climate change and disasters. This article situates the phenomenon of cross-border relocation within a history spanning the 18th century to the present, connecting resettlement programmes with legally-sanctioned population transfers and exchanges.
I N T R O D U C T I O N
In recent years, there has been a renewed focus on community relocation and resettlement as a strategy to reduce vulnerable communities' exposure to risk. 1 In particular, the Cancun Adaptation Framework, adopted during the 2010 international climate change negotiations, invited states to consider planned relocation as a measure to 'enhance action on adaptation ' . 2 Since that time, a * Scientia Professor of Law and Director of the Andrew & Renata Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law, University of New South Wales, Australia. Email: j.mcadam@unsw.edu.au. This research was funded by an Australian Research Council Future Fellowship. Thank you to Professor Alison Bashford for the rich discussions about some of the ideas developed in this article and to Professor Guy S Goodwin-Gill for suggested additional sources. Thank you also to Rebecca Zaman for research assistance relating to the 'M' Project. Any errors or omissions remain, of course, my own.
1 Relocation and resettlement describes 'the permanent (or long-term) movement of a community (or a significant part of it) from one location to another, in which important characteristics of the original community, including its social structures, legal and political systems, cultural characteristics and worldviews, are retained. The community stays together at the destination in a social form that is similar to the community of origin': J Campbell, 'Climate-Induced Community Relocation in the Pacific: The Meaning and Importance of Land', in J McAdam (ed.), Climate Change and Displacement: Multidisciplinary Perspectives (Hart Publishing, 2010) 57, 58-59. For the purposes of the present article, the terms are used somewhat interchangeably, even though it is important to appreciate that their meanings can be distinct.
number of international initiatives have sought to explore the concept of relocation as a permanent mechanism for moving communities out of harm's way in the face of disasters and the longer-term impacts of climate change. The starting assumption among scholars and policymakers has been that past relocations have occurred almost exclusively within countries, rather than across international borders. The analytical analogue has been the experiences of the development sector over the past 50 years in internally relocating communities to make way for large-scale development projects, such as dams. Indeed, the only examples of cross-border relocation that have been noted are three historical cases from the Pacific from the mid-20th century, 3 thought to be relatively isolated instances. This article, however, situates the phenomenon of planned relocation within a much longer, and broader, genealogy. Drawing in particular on Alison Bashford's recent work on global population, 4 it posits a revisionist history of relocation and resettlement-both as intellectual constructs and tools for population management. By widening the lens through which these phenomena are viewed, the article seeks to do three things. First, and primarily, the article re-conceptualises the history of relocation and resettlement. It positions it as an 18th-century innovation, which, in part stimulated by the writings of Malthus, gained especial academic and political traction from the late 19th century through to the mid-20th century in response to concerns about a burgeoning global population that could not be sustained unless redistributed across under-utilised land. The core premise was that if populations could be transferred from high-density 'danger zones' to low-density areas, then land could be used more efficiently and conflict over limited resources could be avoided. Over the long 19th century and into the mid-20th, relocation was understood both as a pre-emptive solution to anticipated overpopulation and resource scarcity, and as an answer to existing displacement. Thus, when resettlement was proposed as a solution to the Jewish refugee problem in the 1930s and 1940s, this was evolutionary rather than novel.
Throughout the first half of the 20th century, German, Japanese, US, French and British scholars and statesmen regarded the relocation, transfer and exchange of communities, and the identification of 'empty' areas to resettle 'surplus populations' from the world's 'danger zones', as key to international peace and security. Building on this approach, in the 1930s and 1940s, resettlement was regarded as a solution for groups of to displaced refugees-including by US President Franklin D Roosevelt, who established a secret project to scour the world for possible resettlement sites (a 'rational colonization of the world'). 5 At that time, and in contrast to today, refugee resettlement was envisaged precisely as a groupbased solution-the re-establishment of an ethnic community (e.g. Jews) elsewhere-rather than a strategy pursued by individuals or households. Arguably, it was the political failure of proposed large-scale resettlement schemes that caused post-war refugee resettlement to become an individualised solution. 6 Although not explored in detail here, there is an interesting secondary story: refugee issues were incorporated into existing deliberations about resettlement, rather than refugee populations stimulating the notion of resettlement as a possible solution, which tends to be the common assumption. Secondly, the article draws a unique connection between planned resettlement programmes, on the one hand, and legally-sanctioned population 6 Modern scholars have under-appreciated the historical linkages between refugee resettlement and community relocation. In fact, they are cut from the same cloth. The 'M' Project, discussed below, represented the convergence of Roosevelt's concerns from the previous two decades about finding solutions to surplus populations generally, with his concerns about finding solutions for displaced Jews in particular. It was only because prospective receiving states were unwilling to offer large-scale resettlement to refugees as communities that 'resettlement', in post-war refugee practice, came to refer to the movement of individuals and families-that is, as essentially individualist rather than group-based, and the opposite of Roosevelt's notion of group resettlement. Indeed, Robinson explains that in responding to Indochinese asylum flows in the 1970s-the first post-Second World War attempt by the US to absorb a large ethnic group-Indochinese refugees were deliberately dispersed across the country in small family groups. 'The government's strategy of dispersal-even blocking the collective resettlement of family groups beyond immediate family members-was based on hindering the growth of ethnic communities in order to avoid a "Vietnamese problem".' G Robinson, After Camp: Portraits in Midcentury Japanese American Life and Politics (University of California Press, 2012) 29.
transfers and exchanges, on the other. While this article only begins to tease out the implications of conceiving these forms of population management as two sides of the same coin, it starts to bring questions of international law into sharper focus-especially in relation to the protection of group identity and (ultimately) the right to self-determination.
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Thirdly, the article provides insights into why many past cross-border resettlement schemes failed, even when they had powerful political champions. Discussions today about relocation raise remarkably similar themes, challenges and ideas. Understanding the present within a broader historical context provides important context and perspective, which can reveal poignant lessons for any future relocations that might be contemplated.
A comprehensive survey of all international population relocations and transfers since the 18th century is too ambitious for an article of this length. Thus, the article alights on several illustrative relocation 'moments' in the modern period. It situates the Pacific island cross-border relocations within a longer historical trajectory in which they become emblematic of, rather than aberrations in, global understandings of space, land, resources and population. This history encompasses 18th-and 19th-century colonisation-'largely migrations by organised groups, usually under direct political authorisation essentially for government purposes' 8 -and settler colonialism in particular, which was understood as a form of group movement that was clearly distinguishable from individual or family migration. It also takes in 20th-century population transfers and exchanges, and ambitious resettlement plans intended to distribute the world's people more equitably. Though intensely political and ideological, by the interwar period the concept of population transfer had become 'normative'. 9 It was also in the 20th century that it became internationalised, both as an intellectual concept (on the world stage) and as a 'solution' requiring international cooperation. Of course, while 20th-century resettlement was a powerful intellectual idea and rhetorical device-especially for President Roosevelt, whose own country's restrictive immigration laws precluded any large-scale resettlement there-its practical realisation was far less grandiose. As a solution to resource scarcity and unemployment, it was many times mooted but rarely successfully carried out. 10 Indeed, even the proponents of large-scale resettlement were well aware of its inherent challenges. While some dreamed that an international migration authority might be created with the power to redistribute global population along more equitable lines, others saw this as a political impossibility. Thus, the intellectual history of resettlement is a rather different story from its actual implementation: there is a large gap between theory and practice.
Finally, different aspects of this article will appeal to different audiences. It is, in part a scoping piece that raises intriguing and unusual connections that warrant further exploration. It stakes out new foundations on which layers of understanding and research may be built-from a number of perspectives, including that of international law. Primarily, the article is an intellectual history of population relocation and transfer, which will contribute to the emerging literature on planned relocation in the context of disasters and climate change. It will perhaps also prompt contemporary scholars and policymakers in this field to reflect upon their work within a broader socio-historical and politico-economic context.
R E -C O N C E I V I N G T H E S T A R T I N G P O I N T
In the 1930s and 40s, there were three cross-border relocations in the Pacific. Each occurred for a different reason-to facilitate phosphate mining (Banaba/ Rabi), to safeguard against future overcrowding on the home island (Vaitupu/ Kioa) and to overcome resource scarcity on account of poor environmental conditions (Phoenix Islands/British Solomon Islands Protectorate).
11 Until now, they have been virtually unknown beyond the realm of Pacific peoples and scholars. However, in the context of adaptation to climate change and disasters, they have recently gained wider attention as rare examples of community resettlement across international borders that may provide insights into the social, legal and political challenges of group movement. My own research has been part of this. While its lessons remain valid, it appears now that underlying assumptions about the presumed rarity of such cross-border relocations require re-thinking.
Indeed, far from being novel or isolated experiments, these three Pacific relocations were reflective of an intellectual and political Zeitgeist from the late 18th century to the mid-20th century that regarded population transfer and redistribution as a legitimate means of addressing problems of overcrowding and resource scarcity-and, in turn, conflict. 'Population caused war, because it was about land, and it was about land, because it was about food.'
12 The relocation of the Banabans from Ocean Island in present-day Kiribati to Fiji in 1945 was, in a sense, the ultimate embodiment of this thinking, since their relocation would facilitate much more extensive phosphate mining on the island. 'Looking at the matter from the Imperial point of view', wrote the High Commissioner of the Western Pacific as early as 1919, it appears to me that, if it is to be the policy of His Majesty's Government, in order to meet the demand for food supplies, to turn to account all the available resources of the Empire, and to ensure the maximum extent of cultivation, only the very strongest reasons can be allowed to impede the working of a deposit which possesses so great a value for fertilising purposes as the phosphate on Ocean Island. Indeed the interests of the Empire seem to demand that the process of development on Ocean Island should be allowed to continue until the whole island is worked out.
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The notion that the Banabans could legitimately be relocated to facilitate food production for the Empire reflected the thinking of the time, when scholars and statesmen alike were concocting theoretical and practical schemes to address concerns about global population. As Bashford has explored in her recent seminal work, Global Population: History, Geopolitics, and Life on Earth, the phenomenon of global population was a preoccupation of intellectual and political leaders during the first half of the 20th century, with Malthus' 'Essay on the Principle of Population' their 'intellectual and political touchstone'. 14 The notion of Lebensraum-the search for inhabitable space-typically understood as a Germanic expansionist policy, was in fact a logic shared by Anglophone, Asian and Continental scholars. The idea that the world's population could be redistributed from densely populated regions to low-density areas or 'empty' parts of the world through migration, population transfers and colonisation (also described as 'migration for settlement'
15
) was advocated by multiple proponents from the late 19th century onwards, and during the 1920s in particular. 16 The idea of 'surplus' population had taken hold in late 18th-century Britain when, for the first time, there were insufficient jobs for those of working age. With ensuing poverty, some believed that if the excess population could be moved, then pressure on resources would be eased. Although Malthusian ideas inspired resettlement as a solution to overpopulation, Malthus himself was not convinced that group migration would resolve population growth and the attendant problems of unemployment and poverty. In his view, while it would create more space for a time, the gap would eventually be refilled and resettlement would only ever be a temporary solution at best. 17 Yet, colonisation as a form of resettlement became a commonplace understanding and mode of political economic organisation in the 18th and 19th centuries. 19 It was the most widespread and systematic form of relocation the world had ever seen, although it has not generally been conceptualised in this way by migration scholars. 20 Colonisation was a means of alleviating unemployment by providing an outlet for 'surplus' population, where practicable, by moving people as agricultural settlers to cultivate unused land. The government (or sometimes private authorities) ran resettlement schemes that typically paid for the settlers' voyage and a year's supply of provisions. Settler colonialism, in particular, was about territorial occupation and the establishment of a new community. 21 As an exercise in empire-building, it was essential to securing power bases in far-flung corners of the globe. The touting of resettlement as a solution to overpopulation in the 19th and 20th centuries was a variant of settler colonialism, albeit one in which the driving force of imperialist expansion featured less prominently. It was also distinguished from traditional settler colonialism by the idea that resettlement could be to any part of the globe, rather than just to territories already within the sending country's imperial domain.
Thus, although birth control is often seen as the favoured measure by which population was to be regulated during this period, Bashford argues that the history of global population control must be understood as 'a history 19 
A R I G H T T O R E S E T T L E ?
At the 1927 World Population Conference, population growth was posited as the most important problem confronting the world. Since land was finite, and most was now occupied, the challenge was to determine its optimal carrying capacity. This prompted wide-ranging discussions about international migration, food security, underpopulation and overpopulation. 24 Australian census statistician George Knibbs argued that there ought to be a systematic stocktake of the world's land-a census of land and people. 'Must it not take into account the migration and settlement possibilities of the earth, and the adjustment of the normal rights-if there are such rights-of races and nations?', he asked.
25
A list of 'waste lands' was compiled and endlessly studied: Australia, Canada, Argentina, Siberia and Southern Africa. These were countries that were vastly underpopulated and sometimes even described as 'empty'-a notion linked less to human habitation and more to a lack of cultivation.
26
Two explorers were even commissioned to identify areas for possible resettlement.
27 As Bashford explains: habitation. How far had humans actually cultivated land, and how far could they?
28
Albert Thomas, Director of the ILO, even proposed the creation of a 'supreme supernational authority which would regulate the distribution of population on rational and impartial lines, by controlling and directing migration movements and deciding on the opening-up or closing of countries to particular streams of immigrants'. 29 It would have 'the power of deciding the right of overpopulated countries to populate other territory'.
30
While appreciating the sentiment, many viewed it as wholly impracticable. As explained by British geology professor John Walter Gregory (one of the explorers mentioned above): 'I think it would be doomed to failure, as none of the great emigration countries would support it.' 31 While this was undoubtedly true, Bashford notes that the existing League of Nations mandate system was 'entirely concerned with the reallocation of territory and people', and 'adjusting and rethinking global lands and peoples shaped international relations in the decades after World War I'. 32 Proposals such as Thomas's were, therefore, hardly radical.
Some scholars suggested that states might in fact have an obligation to provide territory to people who needed land (and food) if their own citizens were not cultivating that land 33 (an idea echoed a decade later at the Peaceful
Change conference on population and resources). 34 Thinkers such as US demographer Warren Thompson, editor of the Edinburgh Review, Harold Cox, and Indian economist and ecologist Radhakamal Mukerjee argued that immigration restrictions and economic necessity justified Japan's imperial expansion even if it violated international law-an idea sometimes expressed at the time as a special Japanese 'right to live'. 35 This was based on the idea that countries with low populations kept those in high-pressure areas 'pent up within their present boundaries indefinitely'.
36
It is my contention that if plans are made to use these thinly settled lands, as well as to provide for much freer trade between the nations of the world at all times, the inevitable increase in the world's population during the next few decades can be cared for and thus the danger of armed conflict can be lessened, possibly conflict can even be avoided.
37
Thinking along the same lines, Thomas asked:
whether a people has a natural right to reproduce beyond the limits of its own economic resources and to overflow into foreign countries and whether, on the other hand, a people has a natural right to maintain a hold on territory which it does not exploit and from which it is incapable of extracting the maximum yield.
38
He recalled the views of the Brazilian delegate at the 1921 meeting of the International Migration Commission that it was urgently necessary to 'discipline migration in the higher interests of mankind'.
39
Knibbs suggested that each state 'should recognize its obligations to mankind as a totality', 40 implying a kind of erga omnes idea about responsible use of land and the common heritage of mankind. Indeed, the international neoMalthusians adopted as their formal aim: 'To remove the international rivalries caused by the pressure of overpopulation, and thus give opportunity for the establishment of international law leading to federation and permanent peace.' 41 Immigration law was acknowledged as an obstacle blocking the right to freedom of movement, and, in turn, international peace. 42 Thus, These ideas were not without precedent. In the 18th century, international law scholar Emmerich de Vattel had argued that new territories could be claimed by occupation if the lands were uncultivated, for Europeans had a right to bring lands into production if they were left untilled by the indigenous inhabitants. 44 By the 20th century, however, this was no longer the accepted position in international law, and the fundamental principles of state sovereignty and the right to self-determination meant that states would not defer to the idea that they should cede unused land. A number of these arguments resonate with contemporary discussions about 'climate justice': the idea that the states most affected by anthropogenic climate change are those that have contributed least to greenhouse gas emissions, and that the large emitters should be forced to compensate them in some way. Implicitly, they recall these earlier 20th-century contemplations: why should growing populations 'sit quietly by and starve' when others acquired their wealth and land when the globe was open? 45 
R E S E T T L E M E N T A S A P O P U L A T I O N M A N A G E M E N T T O O L
While individual or household migration could ease demographic tension, it could not alone resolve the problem of resource scarcity. Population transfers and colonisation were needed. In 1937, the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation brought together 150 scholars for the 'Peaceful Change' conference to examine the idea of 'international decrowding', premised on arguments by countries such as Japan, Italy and Germany that 'demographic congestion' could be relieved by 'distributing this excess population over underpopulated territories'. 46 Granted, some states in this period were motivated by racial and eugenicist ideologies and 'resettlement' in such contexts assumed a particularly While fascist governments implemented relocation policies in particularly brutal and explicitly racial ways, racial motivations per se did not underlie all resettlement proposals. There was broad agreement across Europe that relocation was a global imperative. 'Resettlement' was a term used, and a practice implemented, by the Allies as well. 49 The highly restrictive immigration laws of certain settler countries were recognised as 'the key factor that rendered the population problem one of international relations'. 50 Ironically, such laws necessitated, but simultaneously blocked, the very solution of mass movement that some were proposing, with French political economist, Etienne Dennery, describing them as keeping people 'shut within their own territories'.
51
Writing in the 1940s, Russian demographer Eugene Kulischer saw 'migratory and colonizing movements' as the only solution to Europe's overpopulation. 52 However, along with geographer Isaiah Bowman, President of Johns Hopkins University, who became a key adviser to President Roosevelt, 53 he was doubtful that colonisation could be realised given the lack of available land and the many failed schemes 'that proved the futility of states trying to organize migration'.
54
Bowman, the leading US expert on resettlement, had analysed over 300 million square miles across the globe with a view to identifying 47 Feingold (1970) In our present nationalized world, in which the best lands have been occupied, and restrictive measures are in force, migration is no answer to economic and social strain induced by so-called overpopulation.
Nor is military conquest either a practical or rational answer. The struggle for additional territory as a step in empire building can be understood; the hope that it will furnish an offset to a high birth rate is based upon an illusion. Even if land could be found, population experts noted other impediments to resettlement: its high costs, incompatible skill-sets (merchants and professionals moving to rural areas, for instance), absence of adequate transportation facilities, concerns about adaptability to tropical climates, questions about disease and insects, states' disinclination to accept 'groups large enough to resist absorption' and slow development. 60 Yet, everyone, it seemed, was talking about resettlement. 'Virtually every refugee group had its favorite resettlement scheme', perceived as the key to their own safety. 61 
In February 1938, the ILO held a conference on the Organisation of Migration for Settlement, noting the 'very lively interest' in the topic. 67 It emphasised the socio-economic importance of group movement, and focused on the problem of securing international technical and financial cooperation to facilitate it. 'Migration for settlement' was described as different from other types of migration, especially because of the high degree of organisation required.
68
Whereas labour migration required only a 'reasonable expectation' that the migrant would find work in the new country, for a group of settlers it is, as a general rule, impossible to leave home unless there is in the immigration country an official or a private body to receive them and establish them on the land. This body must have chosen and prepared the site, drawn up a settlement scheme, and attended to all the questions involved-the supply of capital, the division and improvement of the land, the plan of production, the method of finance, the terms to be offered to the settlers, etc.
The Conference concluded that for any proposed resettlement, prospective settlers would need information about a wide range of elements, including: conditions for admission; customs duties and taxes; maintenance during the different stages of the journey and on arrival; the location of the land; access to communication and transport; information about land law that might affect settlement; information about establishment costs, price and yield of land, and prospects for marketing the settlers' products; general conditions of life in the district; the extent of development works already carried out in the district; and 'any other data for arriving at a better idea of the settler's chances of success'.
70
These were the same kinds of concerns that Bowman was contemplating in his studies of group refugee resettlement. In December 1938, he explained to President Roosevelt that the number of settlers was important; they could only be absorbed 'in limited numbers here, there, and elsewhere' so that there would be 'no shock to the economic structure of the receiving country'.
71
The absorption must be on such a limited scale in any one area that the people already established in the area will welcome the new settlers. That welcome will be greater in proportion as the new settlers are economically well founded, backed up by capital, and able to supply new skills that are desired in the area. All of this means special study of many areas, wise selection of groups to fit particular areas, and economic backing that will make each settlement project a sound business undertaking.
72
The ILO Conference suggested that a formal body was needed to organise resettlement schemes, and that purely commercial settlement would not necessarily offer sufficient security to newcomers, especially since business interests might not 'coincide with the social objective which all colonising activity should seek to attain'. 73 Attention was drawn to the need for very detailed preparation, consultation with both the sending and receiving countries, and special assistance to facilitate integration and relieve financial stress. 74 The Conference also 
T R I A L R E S E T T L E M E N T S C H E M E S
Meanwhile, the growing number of persecuted Jews in Europe added to concerns about population pressure and stability. The idea that resettlement could be a solution for refugees was a natural progression from existing deliberations about resettlement and population transfer more generally. Many public and private refugee organisations emerged and sought land for refugee settlement, such as the Refugee Economic Corporation that even tried to establish a small colony in Van Eden in North Carolina. 76 As noted above, resettlement became the popular and populist solution-at least in theory, if not in practice.
Shocked by the events of Kristallnacht and the Germany's annexation of Austria, Roosevelt called an emergency conference at Evian in July 1938 to address the emerging refugee crisis. As a US, rather than a League, initiative, it was thought that the conference might create a more neutral space and that cooperative opportunities could be widened 'because the initiative comes from an immigration country, not from an emigration country or a country anxious to rid itself of resident refugees'. 77 Roosevelt confided to Myron Taylor, the US representative at the conference, that, in the absence of major political changes in Europe, 'the problem in its larger aspects appears almost insoluble except through a basic solution such as the development of a suitable area to which refugees would be admitted in almost unlimited numbers'. 78 We have been working, up to now, on too small a scale, and we have failed to apply modern engineering to our task. We know already that there are many comparatively vacant spaces on the earth's surface where from the point of view of climate and natural resources European settlers can live permanently. 86 Neither the IGC nor Jewish leaders were taken with Roosevelt's suggestion, not least because it lacked specificity. 87 The British and French argued that there would be no refugee problem at all if the Allies won the war, and the British Foreign Office disapproved of any efforts that might encourage an exodus of Jews, since many of them would likely wish to go to Palestine if offered the prospect of resettlement. 88 Britain had imposed strict limits on Jewish immigration to Palestine, an area of key strategic importance, so as not to antagonise the Arab world. 89 A committee was formed to examine Roosevelt's suggestions, but in the end it took no action. 90 Even Roosevelt's own advisors regarded his plans as overly ambitious. Bowman, who between 1938 and 1942 coordinated a study on resettlement for Roosevelt, was sceptical about the possibility of resettling large groups of people in the 20th century. In his view, the best lands had already been occupied, restrictive immigration laws hindered movement and '[n]o discernible or predictable stream of migration [could] keep pace with the birth rates of conspicuously overcrowded countries.' 91 A number of other resettlement schemes were contemplated in the lead-up to war. Few proceeded, and those that did were certainly not on the scale Roosevelt had contemplated, as the brief discussion below illustrates.
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Alaska
As a large, 'empty' territory, Alaska was seen as ripe for settlement. A US State Department-commissioned report found that Alaskans 'want to see their land populated and it makes little difference whether this population comes from the United States or from abroad'. 93 An elaborate refugee resettlementdevelopment proposal received widespread public support for its 'imagined confluence of needs' and mutually advantageous outcomes for the resettled and host communities. 94 Over 388 newspaper editorials were overwhelmingly positive. 95 Yet, despite in-built guarantees that 50 per cent of new jobs would go to US citizens, political opposition was widespread, especially from those who regarded it as letting refugees into the US via the back door. Roosevelt was counselled not to support the scheme because it 'would lead to a breakdown in our whole system of protective immigration laws'.
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The Philippines
Compared to the Alaskan idea, a resettlement initiative in Mindanao in the Philippines held more promise for the US administration-perhaps precisely because it did not directly encroach on US domestic politics. It was partly a geopolitical 'settler infusion' strategy to introduce up to 10,000 Europeans to counteract the influence of the island's 30,000 Japanese inhabitants. 97 While it received initial support from the Philippine authorities, public opposition mounted as concerns spread that local Filipino agricultural markets would be glutted. In response, the Philippines insisted that any settlers would be restricted to farming citrus, rubber and vegetables (rather than the staple crops of coconut and hemp). These concerns were accommodated and it seemed that the resettlement would proceed. Indeed, in his address to the IGC in October 1939, President Roosevelt said:
I am glad to be able to announce today that active steps have been taken to begin actual settlement, made possible by the generous attitude of the Dominican Government and the Government of the Philippine Commonwealth. This is, I hope, the forerunner of many other similar projects in other nations.
98
However, delays in selecting refugees to settle, problems with shipping and ultimately the outbreak of war in the Pacific put an end to the plan.
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Africa
The US Administration's focus shifted to Africa. Initial discussions centred on the creation of a 'United States of Africa'-a British protectorate that might encompass parts of Rhodesia, Kenya and Tanganyika, and provide a home for 'tens of millions' of refugees, whether Jewish or not. 'How many non-Jewish people in Russia, Germany and Italy do you think would be glad to get out of those countries if there was some place to which they could go?', asked financier Bernard Baruch. 100 They would 'be the best, the strongest and the most courageous people because they are anxious to get away from these over-regulated, goose-stepping civilians of Russia, Germany and Italy'. 101 Indeed, 'the broad plan here outlined would be a solution of the over-population question of all of Europe'.
102
While it would cost a great deal, it was suggested that (mainly) Jews could tithe themselves to raise $300 million to establish the republic. It was thought 97 Feingold (1970) they would start an economic revival, even 'a rebirth of freedom and liberty'. 103 They had in mind the subscription of a number of millions of dollars to the capital of a central bank to be located in the new country. The bank would be the bank of issue for a local currency to be based on sterling, and it would also issue loans in the United States, England, France, and elsewhere. The proceeds of financing would be used to develop the roads, utilities, and other services of the new country. 104 Roosevelt dubbed the African initiative the 'big idea', 105 but once again his ambitions were not realised. First, the British were reluctant to provide land from their colonial territories for resettlement, in part because of opposition from white residents in the region who feared their own livelihoods would be impacted by an influx of European Jews. Secondly, the Zionists were opposed to the scheme. Attention then turned to Angola, at that time a Portuguese colony. Proposed by Bowman, Roosevelt attempted to sell the prospect to the Portuguese government by focusing on the increased prosperity that resettlement would bring both to Angola and Portugal. 106 Angola had been the site of a small settlement by the Boers in 1900, and Jewish territorialists had 'eyed it hopefully' in 1912. 107 In 1931, some German Jews had sought to establish a colony there but were denied permission by the Portuguese government-as were similar proposals by Warsaw and Bucharest. 108 The British government opposed Roosevelt's Angola proposal as 'utopian' and 'unrealistic'. These sentiments may in part have reflected Britain's discomfort that Portugal was being asked to offer up a colony when it had refused its own, but likely also related to British concerns about any territory offered as a 'supplemental Jewish homeland'. 109 While surveys of the area were conducted, in the end the project ceased for a number of coinciding reasons: the outbreak of war, insurmountable transport problems and concerns of the Jewish community.
Italy considered the possible resettlement of Italian Jews in Ethiopia, an option also pursued by the US and Britain. 110 Indeed, Roosevelt wrote to
Mussolini to see whether Italian-occupied Ethiopia might be a suitable resettlement location. Mussolini rejected it but proposed open areas in Russia and North America instead.
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Madagascar was a focus for resettlement by Germany, Japan, Poland and France. 112 In February 1939, the Nazis announced a plan to resettle 15 million Jews either there or in Guiana, but it was little more than a 'giant concentration camp'.
113
Latin America
Latin America was another area on which the US focused its attention, although states from this region made clear at the 1938 Evian Conference that they were not prepared to be primary areas for resettlement. However, in 1939, President Trujillo of the Dominican Republic offered part of his personal estate (Sosú a) to accommodate up to 100,000 refugees as agricultural colonists-an opportunity seized upon by Roosevelt. 114 The US State Department had concerns that Trujillo was motivated largely by racial ideology and a desire to increase 'European blood', and doubted that any settlement could be as large as he suggested. 115 Nevertheless, given the lack of other possibilities, it continued to pursue it. In March 1939, the US sent a commission to survey the area, which reported that around 29,000 families could be accommodated but recommended a trial settlement of 200 families.
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The Dominican Republic Settlement Association (DORSA) was established and a contract was concluded between it and the Dominican Republic assuring citizenship and full civil and economic rights to those who relocated, and tax-exempt status to the colony (provided it did not seek to compete with local businesses). In March 1940, the relocation of an initial contingent of 500 people began. By mid-1942, it was clear that the project would never exceed this number. 'Despite hard work and a degree of progress, Sosú a scarcely proved to be the example that would open other doors. Aside from its small size, problems of discipline and administration, as well as of refugees using the Sosú a opportunity as a steppingstone for immigrating to the US, hurt the colony.'
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British Guiana
Wary of mass resettlement, British officials supported an experimental 'resettlement haven' in British Guiana in 1939. A telegram from the US Ambassador in London to the US Secretary of State welcomed the effort, but complained that it would place the British 'in a strong moral position of which they plan to make full use in the international press, and [enable them] to place the responsibility for any failure to extend the work in [sic] behalf of refugees, both as regards financing and resettlement, on the other principal governments'-namely, the US.
119
A survey and report on the area was released in May 1939, in which resettlement was described as 'feasible'. 120 Nevertheless, an experimental small-scale settlement would be needed initially, and planning began to send 5,000 young settlers (at a projected cost of US$3 million). 121 In the House of Commons, Prime Minister Chamberlain explained the longer-term vision: the land would be leased to the settlers on generous terms, although 'subject to the preservation of, or reasonable compensation for, existing rights, and, in particular to the preservation of the rights and interests of aboriginal Indians'.
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Given that 'large scale settlement, if successful, would result in the establishment of a new community of considerable size', its status and position would clearly become such as to warrant the grant of a large measure of autonomy in local government and the necessary provision for its adequate representation in the Government of the Colony as a whole. Subject to the general control of His Majesty's Government and of the Colonial Government, His Majesty's Government would be ready at all times to give sympathetic consideration to any proposals of this character, but the general colonial services such as Customs and Revenue Services, Currency, Post and Telegraph, Security Services and Law and Order would necessarily remain under the control of the Colonial Government.
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Thus, the relocated group would have a measure of internal self-governance. At the IGC meeting in October 1939, the scheme was strongly opposed by the US administration and the Zionists. In his memoirs, US official Lewis Strauss described the land as 'swamp and jungle', noting that settlement possibilities there had been canvassed by the League of Nations some four years earlier in relation to Assyrians, 'with totally discouraging results'. 124 Nevertheless, a contingent of 500 settlers was retrained and sent to British Guiana in June 1940, before the scheme was halted. With the outbreak of war, attention turned to other matters.
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T H E ' M ' P R O J E C T : 1 9 4 2 -4 5
In May 1942, Roosevelt invited the Smithsonian's chief anthropologist, Dr Ales Hrdlicka, to the White House to discuss the problem of post-war migration. Hrdlicka, a specialist on skull measurement (then still a respected aspect of anthropology), proposed the creation of an expert body on migration to 'chart the problem from the anthropological, medical, and economical points of view', 'determine the countries that will have to discharge their surplus peoples, and those that might receive them' and 'lay foundations for rational selection and direction of the migrants'. At the Project's conclusion in November 1945, over 660 land studies, spanning 96 volumes, had been compiled. 134 It drew upon and refashioned much of the knowledge amassed by geographers and demographers over the previous two decades, 135 On one view, the 'M' Project represented an attempt to secure a fairer distribution of world population to maximise resources and thereby enhance security. On another view, it was a means of bolstering economic bases and power across the globe by redistributing a predominantly white, European population throughout the developing world. Significantly, it found that the ultimate success of resettlement was almost solely dependent on 'adequate financial aid to provide environmental conditions to which the resettlees were previously accustomed. The failure of former resettlement projects was attributed to the usual disregard for this essential pre-condition.'
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In the end, the 'M' Project ground to a halt after Roosevelt's death when President Truman declined to continue it. Its main recommendation had been that one million families would require resettlement after the war, at an average cost of $25,000 per family, and that this should be administered by a UN International Settlement Authority with an annual budget of $1 billion. 140 Overall, its findings were never acted upon, not least because they were classified until 1960. 141 But beyond that practical impediment lay a more fundamental obstacle: 'The scientific will to study refugee resettlement was severed from the will to do anything about it.' 142 Arguably, part of the problem was Bowman's own attitude towards the task at hand: he regarded the 'M' Project as being less about developing a workable resettlement policy, and more about the thrill of the intellectual inquiry. As his colleague StrauszHupé explained, the 'M' Project was a 'scholarly investigation of land settlement' rather than a resettlement programme.
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P O P U L A T I O N T R A N S F E R S : R E A L I S I N G M O V E M E N T
For all the talk of resettlement, very few schemes were realised in practice. On the whole, the only large group movements that did materialise were population transfers designed to redistribute ethnic minorities (created by the redrawing of boundaries after the First World War) to territories where they had a greater affiliation. 144 Population transfer was considered to be an orderly means of solving territorial and ethnic conflict through 'the organized removal of an ethnic group from its country of residence, and its subsequent resettlement in territories under the sovereignty of its ethnic homeland, an operation generally based on interstate agreement'. 145 The idea was to create peace through homogeneity. Rather than making frontiers fit around populations, why not make populations fit the frontiers? 146 'Transfers' encompassed both unilateral movements and exchanges of population between states-essentially, reciprocal group migration of ethnic minorities. These were based on a very different rationale from population redistribution necessitated by overcrowding and resource scarcity, although the end goal of both was to reduce conflict. A series of early treaties had facilitated exchanges between Bulgaria and Turkey, Bulgaria and Greece, and Turkey and Greece, 147 and more followed during and after the Second World War. 148 According to legal scholar Alfred de Zayas, population transfer came to be seen as 'a legitimate solution of demographic problems', even 'a panacea'. 149 Similarly, Umut Ö zsu argues that the creation of exchange treaties lent a formality and 'international legal legitimacy to a set of movements that redistributed land and capital', such that population transfer became 'a distinct mode of nation-building through "modern" international law'. 150 Whereas the 'M' Project provided the vehicle for testing President Roosevelt's visions for relocation, the British Foreign Office established its own academic research group to examine (among other things) the feasibility of population transfer. Based at Balliol College in Oxford, the Foreign Research and Press Service was commissioned in 1940 to prepare a factual paper on whether population transfer, on a case-by-case basis, was 'desirable, workable and durable'. 151 The resulting report (and subsequent studies undertaken between 1940 and 1942) revealed three important insights into academic attitudes at the time:
First, it was inevitable that some transfers of German population would have to be undertaken at the end of the war. Second, it was recognized, even by those strongly opposed on principle to compulsion, that such transfers would be necessary as a policy of 'last resort'. And, third, if transfers of German populations on strategic grounds . . . were to have a lasting contribution to peace in Europe they would have to be limited in scope. 152 In November 1943, the Foreign Office created an Interdepartmental Committee on the Transfer of German Populations and tasked it with writing a detailed feasibility study on the transfer of Germans from Poland and Czechoslovakia. Once again, the committee proceeded on the basis that such transfer was 'prima facie desirable', 153 and examined Germany's ability to absorb relocated groups, the necessary conditions to ensure minimal suffering to those who moved (and the sending and receiving states), the cost of transfer and the possibility of settlement outside Germany. 154 Joseph Schechtman, a Ukrainian Zionist who migrated to the US and cofounded the Bureau for Study of Population Migration, was fascinated by the concept of population transfer. 155 In his seminal works, he documented the many population exchanges within Europe between 1939 and 1955, and within Asia (predominantly India, Armenia and Assyria) immediately after the Second World War. 156 In essence, Schechtman's work on European population transfers was a critique of the legal regime of minority protection established by the League of Nations after the First World War. In his view, peace would not come through formal, legal mechanisms, but rather by transferring minorities into 'larger ethnic groups whose language they speak, to whose customs they have least antagonism, and to whom, spiritually, they owe allegiance'. 157 At its heart, his extensive study was about restoring equilibrium for groups that had never moved but had been rendered minorities by virtue of changed national boundaries. Population transfers (or exchanges, in many cases) would enable them to live in the state with which they had ethnic links, rather than the one 'artificially' created around them.
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Like many other studies of the period, Schechtman identified the practical, legal and emotional challenges for group population movements, including the need for consultation, consent to be transferred, transport, property rights, reception by the new community, economic opportunities and so on. 159 He recognised that even in carefully planned transfers of the past, 'the grand total of suffering and hardship involved in the displacement-compulsory or voluntary-of millions of people was undoubtedly tremendous in scope and intensity'. 160 It is for this analysis that his studies are most relevant to the contemporary context of planned relocation. Yet, in spite of these considerable difficulties, Schechtman regarded resettlement as 'an instrument of the greatest importance in eliminating the most explosive danger spots in Europe and in securing the future peace of the Continent and the welfare of its peoples'. 161 Although resettlement was 'a pain- Schechtman primarily championed relocation as a 'preventive' strategy for solving minority problems, and used his studies to support his call for an ArabJewish population exchange in Palestine. One cannot help but read his ultimately favourable take on population transfer in light of this political position. He argued that: 'A transfer scheme loses its point unless it is applied before matters have come to an explosive climax and unless it has a scope commensurate with the magnitude of the problem.' 165 In this way, his work was reminiscent of Zionist Ze'ev Jabotinsky, who in 1940 pronounced the minorities system dead. For Jabotinsky, only the mass, organised transfer of Jews to Palestine, and the creation of a separate state, would lead to peace. 166 
H U M A N R I G H T S C O N C E R N S W I T H R E S P E C T T O P O P U L A T I O N T R A N S F E R S
Since the period canvassed in this article pre-dates the emergence of the international human rights treaties after the Second World War, it is perhaps unremarkable that deliberations about the feasibility of resettlement focused primarily on practical matters: the availability and quality of land and livelihoods, organisation of transport, transfer of property and assets, funding and so on. However, some scholars and statesmen did identify the underlying human rights concerns implicit in group population movements, most notably in the context of minority population transfers. 167 These related to questions of forced versus voluntary movement; linguistic, cultural and religious identity; and selfdetermination. The psychological, economic and practical barriers to uprooting people from their homes were constantly raised. While discussions about relocation today (in the context of climate change and disasters) resonate more 165 Schechtman (1949) 84. strongly with the historical conception of resettlement as a strategy to alleviate overcrowding and resource scarcity, the human rights concerns inherent in ethnic population transfers are especially relevant to the protection of community, identity and belonging today. Even though most of the population-exchange treaties included an individual right of option to remain (which many people exercised), 168 many transfers were in practice compulsory and carried out under the threat of force. 169 Indeed, Balladore Pallieri argued that there was no such thing as an entirely voluntary population exchange. This is why they were sometimes described as mass expulsions, since arbitrary transfer without consent is unlawful under international law. 170 Indeed, it is interesting to note that early English usage of the term 'refoulement'-the prohibition on returning individuals to persecution-referred to 'the forced relocation of a group of people'. 171 By and large, leading jurists and students of minority problems agree that unconditionally compulsory transfer is wholly inconsistent with democratic concepts of human rights. There is something deeply shocking in the idea that human beings may be indiscriminately transferred or exchanged like goods or cattle, without having any legal right to protest or appeal. Among the prospective evacuees there are certain to be some for whom the abandonment of their homeland and resettlement in another country entail insupportable tragedy. In such cases, irrespective of their number, it would be needlessly cruel and a violation of the principle of individual self-determination to compel departure, withholding all legal means of obtaining exemption from the transfer.
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Writing in 1944, Leonard Woolf urged 'the greatest caution' with respect to population transfers being 'so freely canvassed as a panacea for international problems'.
They spring from the same kind of political philosophy as that of the Nazis-namely that anything can be accomplished by grandiose and violent measures. The whole conception is false. In politics-and particularly in international politics-grandiose schemes which can only be realised by ruthless violence and which disregard the rights and happiness of large numbers of helpless ordinary people are incompatible with prosperity and peace and therefore with civilisation. In relation to such humanitarian objections, Stephen B Jones, Associate Professor of Geography from the University of Hawaii, argued that while the resettlement of minorities was not easy, and that even 'if accomplished in a humane fashion, resettlement is costly', 'the trouble and cost are . . . vastly less than the trouble and cost of war'. 180 Similarly, Viscount Cranbourne in the House of Lords reluctantly observed that:
[T]he suffering caused by a week's war would be more than the suffering caused by the efficient resettlement of these populations whose present situation is liable to endanger future peace. If, therefore, transfer, and transfer alone, seemed likely to ensure peace, I should personally take the view that the humanitarian argument must not be given more than its proper weight in the balance of considerations.
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Nevertheless, he remained convinced that this 'drastic' measure should be used 'only if all other methods are likely to fail, and if the minority problem in question is likely seriously to endanger peace. The saving of peace is the crucial point.'
182 The considerable gap between transfer as 'a clean theoretical solution'
and 'its messy practical application' was, however, becoming all too apparent.
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By the late 1940s, the idea of universal individual human rights had started to take priority over community-based minority rights. According to historian Matthew Frank, this shift fundamentally reoriented attitudes towards population transfer: 'The rhetoric and legal framework of human rights, which henceforth became a salient feature of the postwar settlement, helped militate against the revival of grand schemes for internationally sanctioned population transfers that had characterized Europe's mid-century crisis'. 184 180 
